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§8.84

“Testimonial” Hearsay —Reach and Limits of the Crawford Doctrine

Beginning with the landmark opinion in Crawford in 2004, the Confrontation Clause requires
courts to exclude “testimonial” hearsay, when offered against a defendant in a criminal case. 1
Although Crawford represented a fresh start, many older cases would be decided the same way in
the new regime. In particular, the Court in Crawford took pains to say that the Confrontation
Clause is satisfied if the speaker testifies at trial and can be cross-examined then about what he
said before. In other words, “deferred” or “later” cross satisfies the clause. Crawford also said the
Confrontation Clause is satisfied if the speaker is unavailable at trial but was cross-examined at an
earlier time. In other words, “prior” cross also satisfies the clause, at least if the speaker is
unavailable at trial. 2
Crawford displaced Roberts
Crawford displaced the approach to confrontation that had coalesced in the Roberts case almost
25 years earlier. Roberts had adopted a two-pronged approach turning on unavailability of the
declarant and indicia of trustworthiness that would justify dispensing with cross-examination at
trial. In theory, the unavailability criterion meant that prosecutors had to call available witnesses,
but in practice courts applied this criterion to statements offered under the former testimony
exception, and generally not elsewhere. In practice, the indicia of trustworthiness required by
Roberts was satisfied if a statement fit a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception. 3 This category
embraced most major exceptions, but not the against-interest exception (for statements against
“penal” interest), nor the catchall, nor child victim hearsay exceptions, and statements offered
under these exceptions required particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
The Crawford facts
In Crawford, a man named Michael Crawford was charged with assault in a stabbing incident
in which the victim had allegedly tried to rape defendant’s wife Sylvia. Michael and Sylvia were
arrested and questioned separately. His account suggested that the victim was armed, but hers
could be understood to mean that he was not armed. At trial, Michael Crawford invoked the
privilege against adverse spousal testimony, and the state offered Sylvia’s statement to police
under the against-interest exception. Although it was defendant’s claim of privilege that kept
Sylvia from testifying, the defense also claimed that using her statement violated his confrontation
rights. The Court agreed. The reason was that her statement was “testimonial” in nature: She made
it while in custody during formal questioning at the police station, where she had been separated
from her husband pursuant to standard investigative strategy, and it is just such statements that are
§8.83 1. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. See §§8.87 (prior cross) and 8.88 (later cross), infra.
3. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).

the concern of the Confrontation Clause.
Actual testimony, direct substitutes
Under Crawford, “testimonial” statements include two huge categories of important
material—actual testimony in trials or other proceedings, direct substitutes for testimony (like
affidavits prepared for court proceedings), and most statements to law enforcement officers
investigating crimes.
Beyond these categories, the scope of “testimonial” hearsay is harder to describe. Crawford said
it was unnecessary to define the concept further because statements “taken by police” during
“interrogations” (the very facts of the case) are testimonial under “even a narrow” interpretation.
But the Court offered three formulations of “testimonial.” One holds that a statement is testimonial
if it amounts to “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent,” such as affidavits,
custodial examinations, or pretrial statements that the speaker “would reasonably expect to be
used” by prosecutors, and prior testimony that defendant could not cross-examine. Another
formulation treats as testimonial any out-of-court statement found in “formalized testimonial
materials,” like affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. The third formulation treats
as testimonial any statement that would “lead an objective witness reasonably to believe” that the
statement “would be available for use at a later trial.” 4
It is this third formulation that has proved problematic.
One reason is that the third formulation, unlike the first two, reaches some statements made in
private settings. Professor Friedman, who went further than anyone else to develop the concept of
testimonial hearsay adopted in Crawford, argues that such statements are often testimonial. He
says, for example, that a statement by one “claiming to the victim of a crime and describing the
crime” is “usually” testimonial, whether made to a friend or to authorities, although he also thinks
a statement “made before the crime is committed” is not testimonial, at least if the later crime
spans “a short period of time.” 5
Troublesome third formulation
A second reason is that the third formulation could qualify the other two, because people
speaking to police in exigent situations are sometimes so caught up in the press of the moment that
they are unconscious or hardly aware that an investigation might ensue. In such emergency
settings, those who talk to police may be seeking aid or trying to solve a pressing problem, and
such thoughts might smother any other thoughts or states of mind. In 2006, the Court addressed
this matter in the Davis case, where it crafted the “emergency exception,” finding that hearsay
statements to authorities are admissible after all, so far as the Confrontation Clause is concerned
(the hearsay doctrine might still pose an obstacle), if the “primary purpose” was “to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” 6
4. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
5. Friedman, Confrontation, The Search for Basic Principles, 86 Geo. L. Rev. 1011, 1040-1043 (1998).
6. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), discussed in §8.85, infra.

Emergency exception
Beyond the clear examples of testimonial statements (actual testimony, affidavits and statements
to police investigating crimes), it is worth bearing in mind the stress in Crawford on the point that
statements are testimonial if the speaker is acting as a witness by “bear[ing] testimony” against the
accused.
Four factors
This basic idea, and the discussion in Crawford and Davis, lead to a consideration of four
overlapping factors that bear on the question. First is the understanding, expectations, or
anticipation of the speaker. Second is the involvement or role of law enforcement or other officials
in eliciting or receiving the statement. Third is the effect of privacy—of the impact that being out
of official view has on the expectations and understandings of the speaker, which leads to a
consideration of the nature of the speaker and the statement (is the speaker a crime victim or an
eyewitness? Does the statement describe a crime?). Fourth is the presence or absence of
formalities. Was the statement taken in a formal setting, such as a courtroom or police interview
room, or somewhere else? Was it recorded, or transcribed by a stenographer, or written down, or
was it merely an oral utterance, perhaps given spontaneously or off the cuff?
(1) Speaker’s expectations
The first and most important factor is the speaker’s “expectations” (to use the term found in
Crawford). 7 Naturally these are very much a function of the nature of the statement, whether
describing a crime (“x pulled the trigger”) or something entirely innocent in itself (“a blue car
pulled out of the parking lot”), and also the circumstances in which the speaker finds himself,
whether among friends or relatives, or talking to strangers or police. To the extent that the speaker
would understand or expect that what he says will be used in investigating or prosecuting crime,
such when he reports a crime to authorities, it is likely to be testimonial. 8 To the extent that he
would not expect that, such as when he discusses a crime with a friend, a cellmate, or an undercover
police officer, the statement is likely not to be testimonial. 9
What counts is not the stronger or more focused mental state that we call “purpose” or “intent,”
7. United States v. Larson, 460 F.3d 1200, 1213 (9th Cir. 2006) (speaker’s awareness or expectation is
determinative); United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2005) (“where an objective witness reasonably
anticipates” that his statement will be used at trial, it is “likely to be testimony in the sense that it is offered to
establish or prove a fact”).
8. United States v. Harper, 514 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2008) (accomplice’s statement to law enforcement agents held
testimonial).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004) (accomplice’s statement to an undercover officer not
testimonial); United States v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2007) (accomplice’s statement to roommate not
testimonial); United States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2007) (statement to cellmate not testimonial).

but a more general notion of expectancy. A statement to police describing a crime can be
testimonial even if the speaker was not purposely trying to aid in investigating or preparing for
trial, so long as he understood or expected that what he said would be used in this way. This broad
standard is appropriate in insuring that the Confrontation Clause has broad coverage, and it differs
from the far narrower standard that applies when the question is whether misbehavior by the
defendant forfeits his rights under the clause. 10 The standard is necessarily “objective,” meaning
that a statement can be testimonial if a reasonable person in the speaker’s position would harbor
such expectation. A subjective standard would be hard to administer and would likely produce
quixotic results. An objective standard serves the underlying values because it amounts to an
estimate or approximation that “gets it right” in most cases (most have the expectation that we
think a reasonable person would have). 11
The decision in Davis did not modify the expectation standard, but added a qualification. Davis
stressed the “primary purpose” of the 911 call in dealing with an emergency, apparently referring
both to police (acting through the 911 operator) and the caller: In effect, Davis said that even if a
speaker understands or expects that his statement might be used in investigating or prosecuting
crime, it is nontestimonial if his primary purpose is to address an ongoing emergency. In other
words, a primary purpose to address an emergency overrides in importance any other expectation
of the speaker relating to investigating or prosecuting crime, and in this way removes a statement
from the testimonial category. 12 Whether Davis can be construed to mean that some other “primary
purpose” (such as dealing with injuries) can overcome or displace a testimonial expectation
remains to be seen, but some modern authority has moved in this direction. 13
The second factor is the involvement or lack of involvement of police or law enforcement in
taking or eliciting a statement. Such involvement suggests strongly that a statement is testimonial,
and the absence of such involvement is often important in deciding that a statement is not
testimonial.
(2) Involvement of law enforcement

10. See discussion of the forfeiture exception in §8.78, supra, and discussion of the Giles decision in §8.90, infra.
11. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) (referring to circumstances that would lead “an objective
witness reasonably to believe” his statement would be available for use at trial); Jensen v. Pliler, 439 F.3d 1086 (9th
Cir. 2006) (confession to lawyer implicating defendant was not testimonial; lawyer assured him of privilege, said he
would never tell anyone; would not expect statement to be used at trial).
12. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (“any reasonable listener” in position of 911 operator would see that
caller was facing emergency; caller “was seeking aid”).
13. Seely v. State, 282 S.W.3d 778 (Ark. 2008) (admitting statements by three-year-old abuse victim, made in
hospital to social service worker; “primary purpose” test can be “modified for use” outside context of police
interrogations; primary purpose of speaker and listener count; she had duty to report, but primary purpose of social
worker was to define scope of examination and ensure safety) (nontestimonial). But see State ex rel. Juvenile Dept.
of Multnomah County v. S.P., 215 P.3d 847, 859 (Or. 2009) (child’s statement to Child Abuse Response Service
was testimonial; social worker functioned as agent for law enforcement).

When police or law enforcement officers investigate, and when they and prosecutors prepare
for trial, their actions count in two ways. First, the fact of official involvement in gathering
statements brings into play the concerns underlying the Bill of Rights in protecting citizens against
overreaching government. Second, their involvement makes it more likely that the speaker (a
reasonable person in his position) would understand that he is participating in an investigation or
prosecution. Crawford referred to official involvement in mentioning police “interrogations,” and
Davis referred to the same thing in saying that the primary purpose of police was “to investigate a
possible crime.” 14
The nature of official conduct also counts: If law enforcement officers elicit statements while
investigating crimes or preparing for trial, the statements are more likely to be testimonial than
volunteered statements. The more active official role brings into play the concerns underlying the
Bill of Rights, and also makes it even more likely that the speaker expects or understands that he
is playing a role in the investigative process. Crawford used the term interrogation “in its
colloquial” sense, embracing any kind of police questioning during an investigation, including
informal interviews on the street or in homes or places of work or crime scenes, again pointing
toward a broad view of the testimonial category. 15 Crawford contrasted this “colloquial” idea
against the “technical legal” notion of interrogation, which connotes questioning in an interview
room in a stationhouse, where police often ask witnesses to write things down or employ
stenographers for this purpose, producing signed statements, or record interviews electronically.
Of course formalities help ensure that statements are testimonial (more on this point below), but
the Crawford majority did not consider them essential, and were stressing the active role of law
enforcement as a relevant factor. Justices Thomas and Alito have taken the opposite view, treating
formalities as essential, which would narrow the category substantially. 16
Still, active official involvement in eliciting statements is neither necessary nor sufficient. In
Davis, the Court took pains to say that statements can be testimonial without police questioning.
A sufficient reason is that a speaker might not only expect, but actually intend to aid in
investigating and prosecuting crime even if he comes to police on his own and speaks without
being questioned. Davis cited the Walter Raleigh case, where the evidence included “a letter from
Lord Cobham that was plainly not the result of sustained questioning.” 17 On the other side of the
coin, the whole idea of the “emergency” exception is that statements elicited by police questioning
are not necessarily testimonial. Davis treated the 911 operator as an agent of police, and she called
the woman back (she had hung up and the conversation took place when the operator placed a
“reverse” call). The operator questioned the woman, eliciting her statements, and still the
emergency doctrine applied and the statements were nontestimonial. We can expect the same
14. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (there was no emergency; focus was not “what is happening,” but
“what happened”).
15. Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218 (Mass. 2006) (admitting six-year-old’s statements to doctor
describing abuse; police were in building, not in room; no indication that they instructed doctor).
16. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (Justice Thomas concurrence) and Giles v. California, 554 U.S.
353 (2008) (concurring opinions by Justices Thomas and Alito).
17. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).

outcome if, for example, a woman imperiled by domestic abuse hales an officer seeking help
instead of calling 911. 18
Statements made to police might not be testimonial for other reasons as well. Professor
Friedman points out that coconspirator statements to undercover agents are not testimonial, and
argues persuasively that the same is true of lies made to police in order to throw them off the scent
(often admitted as nonhearsay false exculpatory statements), and incoming calls intercepted by
police at places involved in drug selling or illegal betting (usually admitted as nonhearsay). Such
statements are not testimonial because they are ongoing criminal behavior, because the speaker is
not trying to make evidence or further an investigation, and because police are not trying to make
evidence that sheds light on past events. 19
(3) The privacy factor
The third factor is the degree of privacy surrounding the statement. Neither Crawford nor Davis
dealt with statements in private settings. The Court has commented, however, that such statements
are not testimonial, although it has not yet had to decide the point authoritatively. 20 Scholars
disagree on the significance of this factor: One can read Crawford and Davis as placing so much
emphasis on the combination of speaker expectations and official involvement that purely private
statements are not testimonial under a kind of per se rule. But it is also possible to read Crawford
and Davis to mean that speaker expectation is the factor overriding importance, in which case some
purely private statements may be testimonial. 21
Consider an account of a crime given by a victim or bystander to a neighbor over the back fence,
or to a spouse or friend, which can function very much like testimony if the speaker asks the
listener to contact police, and perhaps even if she does not make this request but expects that the
listener will do so, and maybe even if the speaker simply assumes that police will uncover what
she is saying. A speaker, particularly if she is a crime victim, may anticipate (or intend or hope)
that the listener will call the matter to the attention of authorities. Finally, some private statements
describing crimes are blatantly “accusatory,” purposefully charging another with a criminal act,
18. Id.
19. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of “Testimonial,” 71 Brook. L. Rev. 241, 253 (2005). See also United
States v. Alcorta, 853 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2017) (recorded jailhouse conversations among conspirators were not
testimonial) (they fit coconspirator exception). On coconspirator statements made to undercover agents, see the
ensuing discussion, and see the discussion of the coconspirator exception in §8.33, supra. On incoming drug calls and
lies to mislead police, see the discussion in §8.22, supra.
20. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (statements about abuse and intimidation, made to “friends and
neighbors,” as well as statements to doctors in “course of receiving treatment” would be excluded, “if at all, only by
the hearsay rules,” not as testimonial statements under Confrontation Clause).
21. Compare Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 Geo. L.J. 1011 (1998) (private statement
is testimonial if declarant expects it to be used in prosecuting or investigating crime) with Amar, Confrontation
Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 86 Geo. L.J. 1045 (1998) (limiting testimonial to statements
prepared by government to use in court, excluding accusations out of court by one private person to another).

and this factor counts toward calling the statement testimonial. 22 Such private statements do seem
to fit Crawford’s conceptual framework if speaker expectations are treated as decisive.
On the other hand, most private statements are not testimonial, and post-Crawford decisions
have reached this conclusion in overwhelming numbers. 23 A speaker who recounts the story of a
crime in a conversation with a friend or spouse usually does not expect that what he says will go
any further. 24 Of course most such conversations would not fit hearsay exceptions and would not
be admitted, but the point is that admitting them would not likely offend Crawford.
Particularly in connection with private conversations, the nature of the speaker bears on the
inquiry, mostly for derivative or secondary reasons: Who the speaker is sheds light on what he
likely understood when he spoke, and on the function of his statement in investigating or
prosecuting crimes. Contrast the cases in which a victim speaks of a crime, and a bystander speaks
of the same crime. If a shop is held up by a gunman, and the owner was on the scene and was
victimized by being threatened and by incurring personal losses, her statement recounting the
crime is more likely to be testimonial than a similar description by a bystander. The victim, more
than a bystander, is likely to anticipate (and hope for and intend) that something be done, and his
statement is likely to be the single most important datum on which an investigation will proceed. 25
Again in private conversations, the nature of the statement bears on the inquiry, mostly for
derivative or secondary reasons (it sheds light on the speaker’s understanding and the role of the
statement in investigating crime or preparing for trial). A statement describing an apparent crime
is more likely to be testimonial than one that describes an apparently innocent act. Thus one who
tells a friend “it’s Jack in there with the gun robbing that shop” is more likely to expect that what
he says will be passed along to police than one who says “that guy speeding away from the store
is Jack.” In terms of the role of such statements in investigating and preparing for trial, either may
be critical, but “innocent” statements are less likely to be testimonial because of speaker
expectations. 26

22. State v. Shafer, 128 P.3d 87, 95 (Wash. 2006) (dissent argues that statement to “private individual” may be
testimonial, citing parent, teacher, or doctor who suspects abuse and questions child).
23. See Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. Rich.
L. Rev. 511, 540 (2005) (statements to family, friends and acquaintances without intent that they be used at trial are
usually found to be nontestimonial, even if they incriminate another).
24. State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008) (child’s statement to mother saying “Daddy beat me” was
nontestimonial); Pantano v. State, 138 P.3d 477 (Nev. 2006) (child’s statement was not testimonial; parent inquiring
about abuse is concerned with “health, safety, and wellbeing” of child, which is not gathering evidence); State v.
Lawson, 619 S.E.2d 410, 413 (N.C. 2005) (victim’s statement to friend en route to hospital were nontestimonial; not
thinking of “anything outside the scope of their private conversation”).
25. In re E.H. v. E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1035 (Ill. App. 2005) (child’s statement to grandmother alleging sexual
assault were testimonial), app. allowed, 833 N.E.2d 295 (2005).
26. State v. Staten, 610 S.E.2d 823 (S.C. 2005), vacated, 374 S.C. 9 (2007) (murder victim’s statement to friend that
defendant had threatened him with a gun was nontestimonial; objective witness would not think his statement would
be available for later use at trial).

Statements made before crimes are committed, that describe past behavior by the defendant that
may be threatening or hostile without being criminal (or not seriously criminal), are sometimes
admitted as circumstantial evidence that sheds light on defendant’s later conduct. Sometimes such
a statement fits the state of mind exception because it bears on what the speaker did or did not do
later. By its very nature, such a statement is likely not to be testimonial because it does not describe
criminality that the speaker expects will lead to investigation or trial, and because private
conversations less often give rise to such expectations. 27
The fourth factor is the presence or absence of testimonial formalities. Few would disagree
with the proposition that the presence of such formalities can be decisive: Statements in the witness
box under oath in court in proceedings are testimonial (they are what everyone means by
testimony), as are direct substitutes (depositions and affidavits made to present facts to a court)
and statements to police in formal settings (interview rooms, perhaps recorded or written and
signed or taken down by a stenographer). Several times Crawford alluded to such points: Thus one
who “makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony” in a way that differs from
“a casual remark to an acquaintance,” and the Confrontation Clause “reflects an especially acute
concern” with such statements. The Court also referred to “formalized testimonial materials, such
as affidavits, custodial examinations,” and “prior testimony,” quoting an earlier concurring opinion
in the White case. 28 In Davis, the Court said most cases applying the Confrontation Clause involve
“formal” testimonial statements, meaning “sworn testimony in prior judicial proceedings or formal
depositions under oath.”
(4) Testimonial formalities
More problematic is the effect of absence of such formalities: Can statements be testimonial
even though some or all of the usual formalities are missing? Davis indicates that even minimal
formalities count on the testimonial side of the calculus: Thus a police interview with the victim
on the scene was testimonial, in part because it was “formal enough” to be “conducted in a separate
room, away from her husband.” 29 Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority in Davis, reiterating
his view that the Confrontation Clause applies only to formalized statements (he had previously
pointed toward this conclusion in Crawford and White), and in the 2008 opinion in Giles on the
issue of forfeiting confrontation rights, Justice Thomas again set out this view, and Justice Alito
agreed. 30
Post-Crawford decisions usually treat the matter of formalities as a makeweight factor, citing

27. Griffin v. State, 631 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 2006) (in murder trial, applying catchall to admit victim’s statement to
friend indicating that defendant was “not supposed to know where we live”).
28. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurring).
29. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (Justice Thomas, dissenting).
30. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (in concurrence, Thomas adheres to view that only “formalized”
statements to police are covered; Alito doubts that statement to police was testimonial).

their presence or absence in support of conclusions resting mostly on other grounds, but the factor
definitely counts. 31

31. State v. Feliciano, 901 A.2d 631 (R.I. 2006) (in murder trial, admitting statement by victim to friend the day
before, describing prior assault; casual remark was not a solemn declaration or affirmation); United States v.
Danford, 435 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2006) (conversation between employee and manager was “more akin to a
casual remark” than testimony); United States v. Franklin, 415 F.3d 537, 545 (6th Cir. 2005) (codefendant’s
statement saying “we hit a truck,” referring to defendant and made to friend and confidant “by happenstance,” was
not testimonial).

